Emotional Support Animals: Balancing Reasonable Accommodations and Access Restrictions

Emotional Support Animals: Balancing Reasonable Accommodations and Access Restrictions

Navigating the complexities of reviewing and responding to requests for an emotional support animal can be challenging enough but the difficulty in responding to the requests can be further heightened in community associations that prohibit certain animals or prohibit the presence of animals altogether. How can a community association respond to a request for an emotional support animal while also respecting the expectations of other unit owners that the requested animal, or any animal, will not be present in the building? Does the animal need to be given unlimited access throughout the building or can the community association confine its presence to limited areas of the community? In Stevens v. Hollywood Towers & Condo. Ass’n, 836 F.Supp.2d 800 (N.D. Ill. 2011), an Illinois federal district court confronted this question and determined that a community association does not necessarily have to grant unlimited, unrestricted access throughout a no-pets building for an emotional support animal but the terms and conditions of the accommodation offered instead by the association still must be reasonable.

Facts

Mary Jo and Ralph Stevens resided in Hollywood Towers, a building with 541 units that had a no-pets policy. Mary Jo suffered from a panic disorder and, in November 2009, her doctor prescribed her an emotional support animal* to assist with her disorder. Mary Jo informed the building’s manager, Joseph Armenio, of her prescription and she volunteered to keep the dog in a carrier in the public areas of the building.

*Throughout the opinion, the court mixes the term “emotional support animal” with “service animal.” These are two distinct terms but, for purposes of this article, we will refer to the dog as an emotional support animal.

A few weeks later, Joseph responded to Mary Jo and requested proof of the animal’s training, a letter explaining how the animal’s training would help Mary Jo with her condition, a letter detailing the prescribing doctor’s qualifications, and a letter for the prescription of the animal. He also told Mary Jo that the condominium association would require the animal to be kept in a container at all times when in the common areas of the building, that she would have to enter and leave through the north and south entrances to the building (rather than the main entrance) when accompanied by the animal, and that she would be required to use the service elevator when accompanied by the animal. Mary Jo, though, did not have keys to the north or south entrances and the service elevator had limited hours of operation.

The next day, Mary Jo provided Joseph with a copy of her prescription that also detailed that she had a disability and she advised him that her emotional support dog was now on the premises. For the next four months, Mary Jo received no response from the manager or condominium association and she acquired a different emotional support dog, which had been trained as a psychiatric service dog.

In March 2010, Joseph contacted Mary Jo because he had been informed that she had carried her dog through the main entrance and building lobby without a carrier, in violation of the restrictions set by the condominium association. Throughout the remainder of the month, Joseph and the Stevens argued regarding the restrictions that had been imposed by the condominium association, with Mary Jo and Ralph claiming that they could not always keep the dog in the carrier and the doors to the north and south entrance were always locked, requiring them to enter or exit through the main lobby. Mary Jo also argued that she could not carry her dog in the container because it would not be able to assist her while it was in the container.

The dispute continued into April 2010, with the condominium association not lifting any of its restrictions and Joseph giving Mary Jo a written warning for bringing the dog into the building lobby and other common areas. The next month, Mary Jo and Ralph filed a complaint with the Chicago Commission on Human Relations, alleging, in part, that the condominium association had denied Mary Jo a reasonable accommodation.

Law

 The court explained that a reasonable accommodation denial claim requires a plaintiff to establish that: (1) they suffer from a disability; (2) the defendant knew of the disability or should have known of it; (3) the accommodation is necessary to give the plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy their dwelling; and (4) the defendant refused to provide a reasonable accommodation.

In determining whether an accommodation is reasonable, federal courts have held that a reasonable accommodation “is one that would not impose an undue hardship upon the entity making the accommodation and would not undermine the basic purpose that the requirement aims to achieve.” U.S. v. Vill. of Marshall, 787 F.Supp. 872, 878 (W.D. Wis. 1991). “The responsibility to offer a reasonable accommodation does not mean that a landlord must do everything possible to accommodate a disabled person; rather courts should undertake a cost-benefit analysis to determine what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.” Clabault v. Shodeen Mgmt., No. 05-C-5482, 2006 WL 1371460, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2006).

Decision

The court then turned its attention to the facts of this case to determine whether the condominium association’s restrictions on Mary Jo’s emotional support dog were reasonable or whether they resulted in a denial of her request for a reasonable accommodation. The court noted that:

Some limits, of course, are reasonable. After all, many residents choose to live in a no-pet building because of allergies, fear of animals, belief that such a building will have higher property values, or countless other reasons that are entitled to respect. As such, the Court agrees with Defendants that they were not required to capitulate to Plaintiffs’ request for “unrestricted access” for the dog . . .

Defendants allowed Plaintiffs to access the building through alternate entrances and as such did not completely deny Plaintiffs access to the common areas of the building. Further, Plaintiffs did voluntarily agree to keep the dog in a carrier, at least initially. Nor is the Court convinced by Mary Jo’s protestations that the service dog needed to be on a leash, rather than in a carrier, at all times.

However, the court still was unwilling to dismiss Mary Jo’s reasonable accommodation denial claim, stating that the condominium association’s restrictions still were required to be reasonable and further facts were needed to determine whether the association’s restrictions had resulted in a denial of her request:

The question of whether Defendants[ ] restrictions on Mary Jo’s access to the building’s entrances and exits while with the service animal were reasonable is a thin thread upon which to hang a case, but the Court hesitates to resolve this issue without a more complete factual record. A key issue, which cannot be resolved at this stage of the case, is whether Mary Jo was required to have her service animal with her at all times. If Mary Jo was required to have her service animal with her at all times (or nearly all the time), if it was impossible to keep the dog in a carrier, and if Mary Jo was at times prevented or discouraged from entering or leaving her residence because of the restrictions that were in place, then it is possible that the Defendants’ accommodations did not go far enough . . .

The Court, cautions, however, that Plaintiffs will have to provide evidence to show . . . that her disability made it necessary for her to travel through the complex by the path of her choosing.

Consequently, while the court affirmed that the condominium association did not necessarily have to give way to Mary Jo’s request for unrestricted access throughout the building for her emotional support dog, the court also did not immediately let the association off the hook, indicating that its restrictions on the dog’s access still were required to be reasonable in light of Mary Jo’s disability-related need.

Conclusion

Stevens v. Hollywood Towers & Condo. Ass’n serves as an important reminder to community associations that reasonable accommodation requests require a careful balancing act. On the one hand, the request must be reasonable and the association is not required to fundamentally change its character or operations to accommodate the request. On the other hand, when offering alternatives to the requested accommodation, community associations must also present reasonable terms and conditions that will still ensure that the requesting unit owner receives the services or emotional support that they need. Illinois community associations that receive requests for reasonable accommodations should consult attorneys knowledgeable in community association and fair housing laws to help them navigate the balancing act of respecting an individual unit owner’s disability-related needs while also considering the expectations of the other unit owners.

 

Kayleigh B. Long is a Member at Hirzel Law, PLC and focuses her practice in the areas of community association law and appellate litigation. Ms. Long obtained her Juris Doctor degree from Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law, where she graduated in the top 5 of her class and served as the Senior Executive Editor on the Indiana Law Review. Ms. Long has been recognized as a Michigan Rising Star in Real Estate Law by Super Lawyers since 2020, an award given to no more than 2.5% of the attorneys in the State of Michigan. Ms. Long has also made numerous presentations on community association law, along with having articles published in the Michigan Real Property Review.  She can be reached at (248) 478-1800 or klong@hirzellaw.com.